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CONTENTS

12 SEPTEMBER 1988

EAST EUROPE

INTRABLOC

New Soviet Weapons for Border Troops
[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 19 Aug 88] 1

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Daily Criticizes NATO's General Galvin
[W. M.; East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 20-21 Aug 88] 1
FRG Urged To Back Chemical-Weapons-Free Zone
[W. M.; East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 24 Aug 88] 1
Canadian Ambassador Discusses Disarmament
[East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 25 Aug 88] 2

SOVIET UNION

A. Arbatov on 'Disarmament and Security' Yearbook
[Alexei Arbatov Interview; Moscow NEW TIMES Jun 88] 3
Arctic: Theater of War or Zone of Peace [M. Bolshakov; Moscow KRAYNAYA ZVEZDA 14 Jun 88] 4
French Test of Nuclear Capable Air-to-Ground Missile
[Yu. Kovalenko; Moscow IZVESTIYA 18 Jul 88] 6
Means for Missile Destruction Described [Moscow TASS 2 Sep 88] 7
Work Continues at Geneva Arms Talks [Moscow TASS 2 Sep 88] 7
Talks Focus on Verification [Moscow Domestic Service 3 Sep 88] 8
U.S., France Hamper Progress [Moscow Domestic Service 4 Sep 88] 8
Conventional Arms Talks Resume in Vienna [Moscow TASS 5 Sep 88] 9
Nuclear Test Carried Out in Arkhangelsk [Moscow TASS 6 Sep 88] 9
First Cruise Missiles Removed From UK [Sergey Terekhov; Moscow TASS 8 Sep 88] 9
Pershing Missiles Destroyed at Longhorn [Igor Borisenko; Moscow TASS 8 Sep 88] 10

WEST EUROPE

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY


CDU, SPD Disagree on Disarmament Policy
[Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG 2 Jul 88] 11
Genscher, Scholz, Teltzschik Agree on Conventional Disarmament
[Stephan-Andreas Casdorff; Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 15 Jul 88] 11
SPD Calls for Further Western Disarmament [Hamburg DPA 1 Sep 88] 12
9 Pershing-2 Missiles Removed From Waldheide [Hamburg DPA 1 Sep 88] 12

FRANCE

USSR, U.S. Reportedly in Connivance on SS-20 Missiles' Nature
[Jacques Sapir; Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI 7-13 Jul 88] 12

ITALY

Chervov Comments on Disarmament Prospects [Rome LA REPUBBLICA 2 Sep 88] 13



INTRABLOC

New Soviet Weapons for Border Troops

AU1908131888 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 19 Aug 88 p 4

[“LGN.” report: “New Weapons for the GDR Border Troops”]

[Text] Nuremberg—Reportedly, some of the GDR Border Troops have been equipped with the 5.45-mm caliber Soviet AK-74 submachine gun whose projectile wounds cause serious tissue destruction. In a way, the projectiles can be compared with the steel cubes with which the former automatic killing devices were loaded. These devices had been installed by the GDR Border Troops along the demarcation line for a distance of 439.5 km. The installation of these caused the GDR's reputation considerable international damage. Therefore they were dismantled by the end of November 1984. As an expert on the self-firing devices, the Wuerzburg international law expert Blumenwitz said that the use of violence at the border-protection facilities is contrary to international law as it constitutes a violation of the minimum human rights standard, which endangers peace.

The plant builder Peter-Michael Mader, who fled the GDR on 31 August 1987, mentions the equipment of some of the GDR Border Troops with the submachine gun AK-74 in a report which he wrote for the West Berlin “13 August Working Group” recently. Mader was stationed with the Sixth Company of the Border Regiment No 23 in Harbke opposite Helmstedt. His report says that the political officer and the company commander reported on the “mode of operations of a new submachine gun” of the AK-74 type. The weapon is already being used by the Third Border Battalion (of the regiment), it is stated. His company is to be equipped with it in 1990. It has a considerably shorter barrel than the Kalashnikov machine gun (KMS-70); the initial velocity of the projectile—this is the velocity measured after it has left the barrel—is 1,040 to 1,070 meters per second (Kalashnikov: 715 meters per second). It was claimed that wounds inflicted by this weapon are deadly. “The high initial velocity (of the projectiles) is said to cause a shock and immediate congestion in the body.” On account of their strong spin, the projectiles (5.45 by 39 mm) have an effect similar to dum-dum bullets, it is stated. According to technical literature, the high-speed projectile turns over at impact, therefore it does not penetrate the human body with its tip.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Daily Criticizes NATO's General Galvin

AU2208115088 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 20-21 Aug 88 p 2

[“W.M.” commentary: “Offer of an Old Hat”]

[Text] General Galvin has once again taken the floor. As the NATO representatives have been deathly quiet since the Warsaw Pact's latest offer of negotiations, people in

the West have been paying him a bit of attention, which the NATO commander-in-chief has not really deserved with his remarks.

The general, who is presently preparing the NATO “Autumn Forge” maneuvers with 340,000 men and not precisely building confidence with this demonstration of strength between the North Cape and the Mediterranean Sea, did not provide any surprises in the beginning. He again complained that “no deeds have followed” the Warsaw Pact's proposals of radically reducing several types of armaments. For disarmament—this expert tries to interpret the issue like this—has to be carried out with advance unilateral concessions by the Warsaw Pact, before NATO even comments on the question as to whether or not it wants to participate. “As long as the Soviet Union maintains its military strength and the hitherto volume of deployment of its Armed Forces,” he stated, there is “no alternative to the NATO strategy of forward defense and flexible response, including nuclear weapons.” The NATO general apparently hopes that this “argument,” which does not become more convincing through hackneyed repetition, will enable him to postpone further disarmament measures to the Greek calends.

However, later Galvin seemed to contradict himself when he announced “a study which is presently being worked out,” according to which it “appears possible to reduce the nuclear warheads available for battlefield weapons and shorter-range missiles in Europe.” Well, well, is this Gen Galvin of all people on the path toward a triple-zero solution? The disillusionment followed promptly: The prerequisite is the “modernization of existing long-range weapon systems.” That is, instead of additional disarmament, we get the opposite: the undermining of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate-range missiles.

Gen Galvin loves to look like a magician. But with his abracadabra he does not even produce a rabbit. What he holds in his hands is only an empty old hat.

FRG Urged To Back Chemical-Weapons-Free Zone

AU2608094088 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 24 Aug 88 p 2

[“W.M.” commentary: “Why Not?”]

[Text] As is generally known, the GDR is vigorously supporting an international convention on the ban of chemical weapons. This is in line with our goal to completely rid our planet from all types of nuclear weapons and other arms of mass destruction. Therefore we have assessed positively the fact that the FRG representative advocated the early conclusion of such a convention at the Geneva disarmament conference. In this connection, he rightly described the results so far during negotiations at the meeting this summer as not satisfactory.

The GDR and FRG share the view that a worldwide ban on the development, production, storage, and application of chemical weapons is urgently needed. This is in line with the principle adopted by both states that war shall never again emanate from German soil, but only peace.

Unfortunately, the FRG does not draw the conclusion—which should be quite obvious in the interest of mankind—from the fact that in spite of the agreement on important passages of the convention on the ban of chemical weapons, which was already reached some time ago, no progress is being achieved in the completion of this document. As a matter of fact, a specific proposal has been submitted to the FRG Government some time ago by the GDR and CSSR Governments, which suggests starting the creation of a chemical weapons-free zone.

It would be possible to practically test the stipulations of a global treaty on the ban of all chemical weapons, which has already been agreed in Geneva, in this zone. This would be extraordinarily conducive to the conclusion of a global convention. This would constitute an important step on the path toward liberating the entire globe from this category of horrible weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately, Bonn has so far not approved the joint GDR-CSSR proposal to set up a chemical weapons-free zone. Following the statement of the FRG representative in Geneva, the question becomes even more urgent: Why not?

Canadian Ambassador Discusses Disarmament
AU2608083388 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 25 Aug 88 p 2

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—Bernhard Neugebauer, GDR deputy minister of foreign affairs, received Douglas Roche, ambassador for disarmament issues of the Canadian Foreign Ministry, for a talk on Wednesday [24 August].

The interlocutors emphasized that the forthcoming 43d UN Plenary Session should make a specific contribution to developing and strengthening the positive tendencies in international relations by adopting action-oriented resolutions on the consolidation of international security and on disarmament. The numerous constructive proposals which were submitted at the Third UN Special Conference on Disarmament in June this year provide a constructive basis for it. After the coming into force of the Soviet-U.S. Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles, attention is now focused on a treaty on a 50-percent reduction of USSR and U.S. strategic offensive weapons, the speedy conclusion of a global convention on a chemical weapons ban, a nuclear test ban, and steps toward reducing armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe.

As was demonstrated by the International Meeting for Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones, which took place in the GDR capital, increasing importance has to be attached to regional disarmament measures, Bernhard Neugebauer stated. In this context, he briefed the guest on the GDR and CSSR's initiatives to create a nuclear and chemical weapons-free zone in central Europe, as well as on the SED and SPD proposal concerning a "zone of trust and security in central Europe."

A. Arbatov on 'Disarmament and Security'
Yearbook
18120096a Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 26,
Jun 88 pp 10-11

[Interview with Alexei Arbatov, D.Sc. (Hist.), by I. Konstantinov: "Stability Was at Its Peak in the Early 1970's"; date and place not given]

[Text] NEW TIMES: I have before me the yearbook "Disarmament and Security, 1987," compiled by a panel of authors you headed. The book has attracted attention by virtue of its unconventional judgements, appraisals and prognostications relating to Soviet foreign policy.

Alexei Arbatov: True enough, the conclusions drawn by the researchers of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations set forth in the yearbook do not always coincide with the official viewpoint. But, of course, we do not claim to have said "the last word" on the subject or to have advanced the only correct solution. The yearbook offers food for thought, for further discussion by political scientists.

NEW TIMES: Foreign policy has doubtless always stood in need of an intellectual groundwork. However, your department which deals with problems of disarmament was founded only two years ago. Prior to that, neither the Institute of World Economics and International Relations nor the other institutes under the Academy of Sciences had any major independent section concretely and consistently devoted to the study of such questions.

Arbatov: You are right. Formerly few scientists studied the problem of disarmament. A vast quantity of factual data was either lost or fragmented in isolated files. I would attribute this partly to the fact that the Academy of Sciences did not adapt quickly enough to the changed political realities. There were also objective reasons. In the 1970s and early 1980s the study of international disarmament policy was regarded as a means of propaganda substantiation of our foreign policy. It was only when the concept of new political thinking began to be realized, when fundamentally new approaches to security issues appeared and when past mistakes were properly weighed, that it became clear that what was needed was truly scientific treatment of disarmament problems and not a doctrine serving propaganda purposes. Above all, what was needed was a basis for working out a purposeful and thoroughly considered policy.

I shall take the liberty of reproaching you journalists on that score. The standard of our journalistic treatment of world affairs does not measure up to the requirements of our foreign policy. This judgement is based on a number of TV interviews in which our journalists did not acquit themselves with distinction, as well as on the many superficial, one-sided and noncritical articles that have

been published on the subject. It is for this reason that this area of our journalism is not taken seriously in the West, nor to some extent in the Soviet Union either.

It would be a good thing if our people working in the mass media had the possibility and the desire to make a systematic study of researches on these issues. The fact is, however, that scientists have far from always provided them with the kind of analyses and data that could enable them to become knowledgeable and well-informed analysts and commentators of the disarmament process.

NEW TIMES: Let us turn to the yearbook. It is a huge, 800-page compilation. Which of its sections do you think might be of the most interest to readers?

Arbatov: I would divide the readers to whom the yearbook is addressed into two categories: the general public interested in matters relating to disarmament, and the experts. For the former, I believe, the most interesting are the chapters and sections analyzing the current process of disarmament and the struggle for security. For instance, the reader will doubtless be surprised by the changes that have taken place in the positions of the sides in the course of working out a compromise solution in the matter of reducing the number of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, and will find a clear, illustrated, intelligible explanation of the relevant treaty in its entirety.

We also examine diverse variants of strategic, technical and political problems arising at the negotiations on strategic and space armaments, on nuclear tests and the prohibition of chemical weapons, and explain the complexity of these problems and the mechanism of their interconnection.

The experts, I trust, will be interested in the section "Problems of Military Stabilities" in which the military doctrines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. and of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO are examined. Discussed also are the criteria by which the proportions of strategic offensive weaponry are determined. The chapter "Strategic Equilibrium and Stability" is, to my mind, actually in a sense revolutionary. And not only because it touches upon problems which are at present in the focus of attention at the talks on reducing strategic offensive armaments. We have included in this chapter data obtained in experiments in computer modelling.

The model and the programme were worked out in accordance with the present nuclear balance between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. When this model was applied to an analysis of the past and the future, with the necessary adjustments, it produced extremely interesting results which demonstrate many aspects of the evolution of the strategic balance intuitively felt by politicians and scientists.

Stability was at its peak in the early 1970s. The calculations show that a first strike at the strategic forces of the adversary far from substantially diminishing the possibility of a retaliatory strike, would have given its initiator no advantage whatsoever.

In the course of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, with the deployment and modernization of guidance systems, with the preservation and even heightening of the mutual assured destruction potential of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, the chances of gaining relative advantages by a counterstrike increased. This gave added incentive to have recourse to a preemptive attack in a conflict situation, which meant that the likelihood of nuclear war was increased and stability undermined.

Part of the scheme drawn up on the basis of computer modelling, beginning with the second half of the 1980s, resembles a rooster's tail. It is based on long-term modelling, depending moreover on whether the unlimited arms race is to continue or whether there will be 50-percent reduction. And if there will be a reduction, on what conditions—closer to the position of the U.S.S.R. or to that of the U.S.?

Analysis of the conception of a protracted global conventional war and the operational concepts of the two sides brings us to the conclusion that war between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries is impossible or at any rate unlikely. From this it follows that many conventional armament programmes can only be a reflection of certain departmental interests, but from the standpoint of the political realities they are totally unjustified.

NEW TIMES: The yearbook contains no new facts and figures relating to Soviet defensive strategy. How did you contrive to pierce the veil of secrecy?

Arbatov: We do not disclose any secrets. We use official Soviet information wherever possible. Where it is not available, and this you will agree remains a serious problem, we give our own analysis, based on the wealth of data available everywhere. After all, neither the London International Institute for Strategic Studies nor the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, for instance, has direct access to satellite or radar information. They painstakingly collect information from hundreds or thousands of sources available to the public all over the world and skilfully analyze it.

As scientists, we too cannot sit back with folded arms and wait for official information. Let me cite a very simple example. How many nuclear warheads does the Soviet Union possess? We do not know the exact figure. But there exist approximate data on the total number of warheads in the possession of all the nuclear powers—more than 50,000. By subtracting from this figure the nuclear potential of the U.S., Britain, France and China (which can also be roughly computed) we get the approximate number of Soviet warheads. We may go still

farther in our calculations. Knowing how many warheads there are on strategic carriers (the figures were cited in an article by Soviet Defence Minister Yazov published in *PRAVDA*) and on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, we arrive at a figure which more or less accurately reflects the nuclear potential of both battlefield and tactical weapons in the land forces, the air force and the navy.

If official Soviet data differing from ours are made public, we shall correct our own data accordingly.

We have already begun work on the next yearbook, for 1988.

/6091

Arctic: Theater of War or Zone of Peace

18010437 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
14 Jun 88 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Capt 3d Rank M. Bolshakov]

[Text] Not very long ago the extreme conditions of the Arctic with its fierce winds, perfidious ice and murderous cold created the impression that it stood far aside from the mainstream of international life. In recent years, however, the stereotype of a "godforsaken hole" has been decisively displaced by the Arctic region's growing role in the modern world.

Today the basin of the Arctic Ocean with contiguous Arctic areas of the European, Asiatic and American continents not only is a world "weather kitchen," but also appreciably influences the entire planet's political climate. This is quite natural. Borders converge in the Arctic and spheres of economic, political and military-strategic interests of many states intersect. Significant potentials for nuclear destruction relating to the two military-political alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—are concentrated here. This region also is of enormous importance for the economy of Arctic countries; it attracts their attention by the very abundant reserves of raw energy materials, valuable metals and other resources contained in the subsoil of northern territories and the shelf of polar seas.

In light of this the intensifying military preparations of the United States and a number of its NATO partners in the Arctic cannot help but cause uneasiness. This is especially so as they are occurring at a time when the world community is awaiting further practical steps along the path to nuclear disarmament and a relaxation of the military threat after the Soviet-American INF Treaty entered into force and when the Soviet-American Moscow summit meeting strengthened anew peoples' hopes for the possibility of arriving at new agreements along the path to a non-nuclear and non-violent world.

The facts indicate that some in the West are linking plans to "compensate" for American nuclear missiles in Europe subject to destruction with northern and Arctic regions. Statements by prominent NATO figures and western press publications are emphasizing more and more often the "growing strategic significance" and "vital importance" of the Arctic for NATO, and calls are sounding for a sharp build-up of bloc military activity there.

It should be noted that U.S. and NATO leaders have had a heightened interest in the Arctic region as a potential theater of war with the Soviet Union for a long while now. From the Pentagon's standpoint the significance of the Arctic always has been determined above all by its key role in scenarios for nuclear attack on the USSR. According to Western press data, it is planned to employ over half of all U.S. ICBM's and up to 30 percent of U.S. strategic bombers across Arctic regions.

To support its nuclear strategy objectives the Pentagon established an entire complex of military installations in the Arctic, using the territories and possessions of NATO allies. The complex includes the northernmost strategic air base in northwestern Greenland and airfields and naval basing points in Northern Norway, Iceland, northern Canada and Alaska. A chain of radar and aerospace surveillance stations and of navigation support, guidance, reconnaissance and communications systems also stretched out here. Armed forces personnel of the United States and a number of other NATO countries practice skills in conducting combat operations in high latitudes during maneuvers held regularly in Northern Norway, Greenland and Alaska.

The activation of U.S. and NATO militaristic preparations now occurring in the Arctic basin is directly linked with strategic aims developed by the Pentagon in the early 1980s for achieving a "decisive military superiority" over the USSR in all spheres. In particular, these aims provide for a concentration of combat-ready strike groupings of the U.S. Navy and navies of U.S. allies in the immediate vicinity of the USSR's northern borders with the objective of providing conditions for delivering a "disarming strike" and sealing up the Soviet Navy in its own territorial waters.

Plans for deploying several thousand Tomahawk cruise missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads aboard submarines and surface ships in the North Atlantic and in Arctic seas also are being considered for these purposes. In addition it is planned to supplement sea-based Tomahawks with cruise missiles accommodated aboard U.S. Air Force bombers on standing patrol above the Arctic. Practice in employing these missiles continues in full swing in the Canadian Arctic sector (six training launches already have been conducted from January through March of this year).

One of the priority places in U.S. and NATO "polar strategy" is given to expanding operations of multirole nuclear submarines [SSN's] in the Arctic. Their primary mission is the secret shadowing of Soviet missile submarines. Speaking to American Congressmen not long ago, U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations Adm C. Trost frankly declared: "We intend to keep the Soviet naval forces constantly in our sights in case of war."

American submarine forces are intensively mastering the Arctic's under-ice waters. According to a report of the American naval journal PROCEEDINGS, from 1958, when the SSN "Nautilus" reached the North Pole under the ice for the first time, up to 1987 U.S. Navy nuclear submarines made over 40 cruises into the Arctic basin. Several cruises were made by British SSN's. In addition to conducting research they practiced surfacing in the ice, practiced tactical procedures for conducting combat operations alone and as part of groups, and tested weapons. The expanding scale of operations in polar waters also is indicated by the fact of the introduction of a special decoration—a blue and white "Arctic Service" stripe—in the U.S. Navy in 1987 which already has been awarded to the crews of 15 submarines.

The program for modernizing and building up the American submarine fleet has a clear Arctic direction. In particular, the Pentagon revised the decision not to employ "Los Angeles"-Class SSN's in high latitudes. Beginning with the 34th (in the "Chicago" series), these submarines are being built in a modified version for ice operation. The first five such SSN's of the 32 planned already have reinforced the U.S. Navy's "polar submarine fleet" of 37 specially outfitted "Sturgeon"-Class submarines built during the 1960s and 1970s. Construction of a series of advanced "Seawolf"-Class SSN's (SSN-21) designed for submarine warfare under Arctic conditions will begin in the near future.

The inclusion of NATO partners of the United States in the arms race beyond the Arctic Circle is becoming a very alarming trend. In recent years Canada's ruling circles have been displaying heightened military activity in the region along with Great Britain. In 1987 the B. Mulroney cabinet announced an ambitious 15-year program for building up Canadian military might in the Arctic. Its basis is a plan for creating [sozdaniye] their own nuclear submarine fleet of 10-12 submarines. The official objective of this program—"defense of Canada's sovereignty in Arctic regions"—does not hold up to criticism even in the opinion of the Canadian press. There is every basis to assume that in accordance with NATO's "offensive strategy," the primary mission of Canadian SSN's will be to take part in "hunting" Soviet missile submarines near USSR shores. It is no accident that the Pentagon and NATO staffs are studying the question of forming a regional allied Arctic command of the NATO Allied Armed Forces which would coordinate operations of all naval, air and ground forces of bloc countries operating in polar latitudes.

Special mention should be made of efforts being put forth in the United States and other NATO countries for psychological support of the Arctic basin's militarization. The unwinding of a wide-scale arms race here is being justified by the very same notorious "Soviet threat" in its polar version. The mass media depict the Arctic as a "nuclear missile bastion of the Soviets" from which, hidden beneath the ice, "gigantic 'Tayfun' submarines threaten the 'western world' with their missiles". The organization of drift stations and Soviet icebreakers' conquest of the North Pole are presented as "Moscow's claims to hegemony in the Arctic." The U.S. Navy journal PROCEEDINGS informs readers in all seriousness that while the American Navy allegedly is just attempting to adapt to the polar environment, "significant Soviet maritime and naval operations in the region began at the beginning of the 15th century (!)." For more than the first year now pages of the western press also have been exaggerating unsubstantiated assertions about regular invasions of the territorial waters of Norway and Canada by "Russian submarines." And so, hastily remaking the cartoon symbol of "Soviet aggressiveness"—the brown bear—into its polar brother with the very same savage baring of teeth, NATO propaganda harps on the rightfulness of building up the bloc's military potential in the Arctic region.

With a coast that is washed by seas of the Arctic Ocean for more than 15,000 km, the Soviet Union naturally has legitimate economic, political and defense interests in the Arctic. Our country invariably has acted and is acting for a radical decrease in the level of military confrontation in the Arctic basin and for turning it into a zone of firm peace and international cooperation.

The concept of security of the planet's North was set forth in detail in a speech by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev in Murmansk on 1 October 1987. Its essence is the elimination of nuclear weapons from the Arctic, restriction of military activities there, and development of a world economic, scientific and ecologic partnership of all interested countries on a mutually advantageous basis. The set of Soviet peace initiatives for demilitarization of the North and the Arctic received broad approval and support from all sober-minded circles of the planet and from peace advocates in Scandinavian countries and Canada.

6904

French Test of Nuclear Capable Air-to-Ground Missile

18010454 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
18 Jul 88 p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA's own correspondent Yu. Kovalenko: "They Are Flexing Their Nuclear Muscles"]

[Text] Paris—Tests of the latest French "air-to-ground" missile, the ASMP, have been conducted at the Air Force base in Luxeuil-les-Bains (Haut-Sane Department); it has a range of 300 kilometers, and the first squadron of Mirage-2000N aircraft were equipped with it on 1 July.

In the presence of President F. Mitterand and Minister of Defense J.-P. Chevremont, the Mirages armed with this missile, which has a nuclear warhead of 300 kilotons (15 times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima), simulated a strike against an "enemy" tank formation which had "broken through" the allies' defensive lines.

The use of such missiles—previously they called them tactical weapons here, but now they call them strategic—is "the last warning" to an enemy, in the French strategists' terminology. A massed nuclear attack against his cities and military bases will follow unless he stops offensive operations.

Just what is the ASMP? It is a cruise missile which flies at an altitude of 50 to 60 meters at a speed of 2,400 to 3,600 kilometers per hour; it is 8.3 meters long and 0.35 meters in diameter, and it weighs 830 kilograms. Essentially, the ASMP is a type of offensive weapon, not a deterrent one. Installed on the Mirages, which also fly at low altitude, and by not being fixed by radars, the ASMP can attack targets deep in enemy territory (supplemented by the new "Hades" tactical missiles with a range of 500 kilometers).

But the purpose of the ASMP is not defined by its advanced technical features alone. These missiles, together with the Mirage-2000N, in the words of the defense minister, should promote the beginning of "a European defense concept." Expanding on this in an extensive interview published in the 14 July issue of the newspaper LE MONDE, J.-P. Chevremont calls upon his allies to assume responsibility for strengthening NATO's European support. At the same time, the head of the military department stated that France will become the motive force in European defense. As far as nuclear forces are concerned, they must play an important role to ensure peace in Europe, in the minister's words.

And while F. Mitterand has repeatedly opposed the NATO concept of "flexible response," the minister of defense, on the other hand, maintains that the French and American concepts can "coexist." Paris will continue modernization of its nuclear arsenals, which does not conflict with the disarmament process, the minister maintains.

Many of those on the banks of the Seine have been very skeptical about the new Soviet proposals on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces in Europe and the convening of a European conference on these matters. But by flexing its muscles in the area of nuclear weapons, writes L'HUMANITÉ, France wants to show everyone by its appearance that it is not concerned about the nuclear disarmament begun by the Soviet-American RSMD [INF] Treaty. Paris believes that Europe should speak with one voice in military matters, and that France should be given the role of the main pacemaker in the "accelerated buildup of European defense."

8936

Means for Missile Destruction Described
LD0309023088 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1818 GMT 2 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow, 2 Sep (TASS)—Correspondent Mikhail Zakharchuk reports:

The Soviet nuclear missile shield—the strategic parity that we achieved—was the reliable and firm foundation on which the new political thinking grew in the world and the opportunity appeared for reversing the exhausting arms race. As soon as the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles was signed, those at the Main Staff of the Strategic Rocket Forces started thinking about how to scrap their dear—in the direct and figurative sense—weaponry.

At the beginning of the year, a center was set up in the USSR for implementing the elimination of intermediate-range missiles. By special order of the commander in chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, about 100 of the best officers from combat units and subdivisions, the best trained and most enterprising, were selected for the center. Colonel Aleksey Gutnikov has been entrusted with commanding the unusual subdivision. It is symbolic that the center has been accommodated in the same building in which the entire strategic rocket forces command is situated.

Should anyone imagine that destruction is not constructive, then with regard to missile technology—which has absorbed the very best of human intellectual capacity—this is at the very least a naive delusion. Nuclear delivery vehicles are so complex that it takes a virtuoso expert to dismantle them. For example, an R-12 [SS-4], which uses liquid fuel, can be bled. Then, when the elements of the guidance system have been removed, the rocket can be broken up using air plasma cutting equipment. The solid-fueled RSD-10 [SS-20] is much more complicated, and the center's officers have had to work hard. In principle, it is not possible to cut this missile up. They ended up with two ways of eliminating it: launching it, or blowing it up.

The first method was not new to missile experts. All of them had been present at training launches, but it was only permitted to destroy around 200 missiles in this fashion. There were quite a few complications that arose in connection with the exploding of the remaining 600 vehicles. In the first experiments, it was found that sizable pieces of fuel remained scattered all over the firing range after the explosion. Some sort of explosion technology had to be developed that would ensure the complete destruction of the fuel and the metal body parts. The center's officers managed to cope with the task in record time.

Parallel with the development of technology to eliminate missile systems, bases for the destruction were built at settlements near Chita, Lesnaya, Sarny, and Kapustin Yar, Kansk, and other places. Technical facilities and housing were built here very rapidly, the bases were manned and fitted out with special technology, and roads and communications lines were brought to them.

Tension at the center reached its height at the end of May this year, when the Ministry of Defense and the leadership of the USSR National Center for Nuclear Danger Reduction made the decision to show radio and television journalists from a number of Western countries the state of readiness of the base for eliminating means of transport in the town of Sarny in Rovno Oblast.

Under the command of officers from the center, the elimination of three intermediate-range missiles took place for the first time ever at the Kapustin Yar testing range, using the explosion method. Among the 200 observers from 51 states was Miljan Komatina, secretary general of the Geneva Disarmament Conference and the UN secretary general's personal representative. He told Soviet journalists that the missile experts had arranged everything splendidly, and thanked his hosts at the testing range for their warm welcome.

Incidentally, the events at Kapustin Yar summed up, in a sense, the first stage in the verification [proverka] of implementation of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

Work Continues at Geneva Arms Talks

*LD0209201788 Moscow TASS in English
1947 GMT 2 Sep 88*

[Text] Geneva September 2 TASS—Discussion in both groups—on strategic offensive arms and space arms—continued in the past week at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space arms under way here.

In connection with the working out of a draft treaty on 50 percent cuts in strategic offensive arms, the USSR delegation continued paying special attention to the consideration and solution of questions of verification. A plenary meeting of the delegations was held on the proposal of the Soviet side. At that meeting, the USSR delegation submitted a new compromise proposal regarding the verification of a number of warheads at intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Combined with the proposals for verification submitted earlier by the Soviet side, the new Soviet initiative opens an opportunity for a decisive progress in coordinating the draft of such an important document entrusted to the delegations, as the draft protocol on inspections.

The work continued to formulate the wordings implementing the Moscow arrangement on the questions of limitation of long-range air-launched cruise missiles and

heavy bombers. As regards proposals for control over mobile launchers of inter-continental ballistic missiles, the work in this area is still hampered by the fact that there has yet been no constructive response of the U.S. side to the wordings suggested by the Soviet delegation.

Work intensified in the subgroup on the protocol on reequipment or elimination of strategic offensive arms, in whose framework the Soviet side also made a number of constructive proposals during the current round. Certain progress has been achieved on some provisions of this document.

The discussion of the question of drafting a protocol to the prepared agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty and non-withdrawal from the treaty for a specified period of time was continued in the group on space arms. As is known, the protocol envisages a complex of measures for verification, confidence-building and enhancement of predictability which are called upon to ensure the confidence that the provisions of the agreement being drafted and the ABM Treaty will be strictly observed. But because of the stand of the U.S. side which continues insisting on the alteration of the Washington formula of December 10, 1987, progress is still lacking in working out a joint draft of the very agreement on the observance of the ABM Treaty and non-withdrawal from it.

Talks Focus on Verification

LD0309220388 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1645 GMT 3 Sep 88

[From the "International Diary" program, presented by Aleksandr Korshunov]

[Text] Hello, comrades! The past week has been rich in international events, which we will try to look at today in retrospect. In the first place, the world has been celebrating World Peace Day, which has become an important landmark in the anti-war struggle of the international public. Moreover, the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons have been continuing in Geneva during these past days. The discussions at these talks proceeded in separate groups, on strategic offensive weapons, and on space weapons. The main aim of those taking part in the talks regarding preparation of a draft agreement for 50-percent cuts in strategic offensive weapons is currently the resolution of problems relating to verification. It was on these problems that the main attention was focused.

At the proposal of the Soviet side a plenary session was held, at which our delegation presented a new compromise proposal. It concerns, in particular, verification of the number of warheads on ICBM's and on submarine-based missiles. Moreover, work continued on coordinating formulations which might embody, in document form, the Moscow accord on matters relating to limiting long-range air-launched cruise missiles and heavy bombers.

Unfortunately, the elaboration of methods of verification for the mobile launchers of strategic missiles is, as before, being impeded. The point here is that for the moment no constructive reaction to the Soviet proposals from the U.S. side is in evidence. In the space weapons group, examination of the question of elaborating a draft protocol to the agreement on adhering to the ABM Treaty, which is currently being prepared, has continued. The draft protocol makes provision for a package of measures for enhancing trust and predictability. They are to guarantee confidence in rigorous adherence to the agreement being elaborated. Evidently, the road to a full and compromise resolution of all of these numerous problems will not be a simple one, and much depends on the position of the future U.S. Administration, which will appear on the political stage very soon, within a matter of months.

U.S., France Hamper Progress

LD0409114088 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
0730 GMT 4 Sep 88

[Text] The summer session of the disarmament conference has been at work in Geneva's Palais des Nations for almost 2 months. It finishes on 15 September. The work of the diplomats and experts is obviously coming to an end. What issues have been attracting their attention most? Where has the most progress been achieved? I will hand you over to Vladimir Dmitriev, our correspondent in Switzerland. Here now is Geneva:

[Dmitriev] It should be noted that the disarmament conference is a unique multilateral negotiating forum which already has a history of more than a quarter of a century. Many of the important international treaties and agreements now in force were drawn up by the conference. Forty states take part in it. It is possible that in the very near future this number will be increased, since applications are now being considered from a whole number of countries that have expressed the wish to join in the forum's work.

The work of the session, as has been repeatedly emphasized in speeches, is proceeding under the favorable influence of the Soviet-U.S. summit-level negotiations. The results of the Moscow summit and the process of real nuclear disarmament which has begun on the basis of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on eliminating their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles are facilitating the search for a sensible balance of interests in the matter of nuclear disarmament, reducing conventional armaments, and other issues being discussed. There has been, for example, the plan of action put forward by India to establish a nonviolent world free of nuclear weapons. Without in the least playing down the importance of this plan, I would like to say that it is very much in accord with the Soviet global program for disarmament of 15 January 1986. A further example is that Czechoslovakia and Norway have submitted a number of proposals on verification with an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests.

Within the framework of the summer session, the special committee on space weapons has ended its work. It has been engaged in questions concerning the prevention of the launch of nuclear weapons into outer space. Unfortunately, there are no grounds to speak of a qualitative breakthrough or adoption by the committee of any important decisions. The reasons are well known. The work is being hampered by the United States and its positions and the Pentagon's plans to militarize space.

It was pointed out at the session that it is particularly important now to concentrate efforts on completing, as quickly as possible, the drafting of an international convention on eliminating chemical weapons. Noticeable progress has been achieved in this respect, but further movement toward agreeing on the articles of the document is being held up by the U.S. delegation's maneuvering and procrastination. The work is also being hampered by the French position. As is well known, France has set about chemical rearment, and this is making itself felt in the actions of its delegation at the negotiations. The French have been putting forward the concept of a so-called safety reserve. This is to say that, if the convention provisionally came into force, France would nevertheless continue to produce chemical weapons. It is clear that other states would follow France. In other words, on this issue there is a kind of undermining of the very principle of the universality of the convention.

One can see that there are many difficulties in the work of the session, but, as many delegations here are emphasizing, they can be overcome if all those taking part in the disarmament conference show goodwill and a willingness to give up acts of narrow, national selfishness for the sake of the general interests of mankind and for the sake of creating a world without chemical, nuclear, or other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Conventional Arms Talks Resume in Vienna
LD0509085688 Moscow TASS in English
0848 GMT 5 Sep 88

[Text] Vienna September 5 TASS—Consultations between representatives of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the elaboration of a mandate for future talks on a reduction in the armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, were resumed here today after a brief recess.

Provisions concerning the objective of the talks and composition of their participants, verification and exchange of data, on a binding international nature of future agreements, on organizational conditions, and a procedure of the talks had been already coordinated at the consultations earlier.

Yuriy Kashlev, the leader of the USSR delegation, in his speech called on the participants to focus their attention during the concluding phase of the consultations on

coordinating the key issues that remain open: a precise definition of the subject of the talks and geographical zone so as to complete the elaboration of the mandate soon and to begin all-European talks on conventional arms as early as this year.

Nuclear Test Carried Out in Arkhangelsk
LD0609180888 Moscow TASS in English
1747 GMT 6 Sep 88

[Text] Moscow September 6 TASS—An underground nuclear explosion with a yield within the range of 5 to 20 kilotons was carried out in the Soviet Union in Arkhangelsk region at 20.20, Moscow time, today.

The explosion was conducted in the interests of the national economy.

First Cruise Missiles Removed From UK
LD0809203688 Moscow TASS in English
1933 GMT 8 Sep 88

[Text] Alconbury, Britain, September 8 TASS—TASS special correspondent Sergey Terekhov reports:

Two heavy military transports of the U.S. Air Force—Galaxy and Starlifter—took off one after another from a runway of the Airforce base in Alconbury, Cambridgeshire county, at 14:00 just as scheduled. The cargo bay of the first plane holds two launchers of Tomahawk cruise missiles, each of which can carry four such missiles. But now they set off for a long flight across the ocean without the usual "stuffing." There are two long white containers aboard the Starlifter, bearing numerous warning signatures and instructions. Each of them holds one cruise missile. Both aircraft veer sharply to the left and head for the United States with lenses of dozens of photographic and nine cameras pointed at them. There the planes' cargo is to be destroyed under the Soviet-U.S. Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

This was how the procedure to move out of Britain two cruise missiles, the first out of 118 to be removed from the territory of the country under the treaty timetable by 1991, the procedure that took up many hours, was completed. This event is noteworthy also because it is the first specific action on the part of the West to destroy this class of armaments on the European Continent.

Two cruise missiles and both missile launchers, dispatched to the United States today, arrived in Alconbury from a nearby U.S. nuclear-missile base at Molesworth. At a press conference held there British Secretary for Defence George Younger described this step as an all-important milestone in arms control and emphasized that the successful implementation of the INF Treaty demonstrates the reality of this process and, moreover, holds out hope for a success in the field of reducing strategic offensive armaments.

At the same time, the minister alleged that the deployment of U.S. cruise missiles and Pershings forced the USSR to conclude the INF Treaty. Younger holds that the dialogue with the East should be conducted from the position of strength rather than weakness. He confirmed the Conservative government's intention to continue building military policy on the basis of the "nuclear deterrence" principles.

Pershing Missiles Destroyed at Longhorn

*LD0809214288 Moscow TASS in English
2111 GMT 8 Sep 88*

[Text] The Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant (Texas) September 8 TASS—By TASS special correspondent Igor Borsenko:

The process of destruction of American intermediate-range missiles, Pershing, started here today, in compliance with the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty signed in Washington last December at the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting.

A group of journalists was led to the elimination site where the first stages of Pershing-1A and Pershing-2 missiles were placed on special concrete and steel platforms. A spokesman for the Pentagon explained that the missiles would be burned up.

10 o'clock in the morning. The control centre issues a command for firing. A jet of fire bursts out from the nozzle of the first stage of the Pershing-2 missile followed by a thundering noise that shakes the test range. The fire goes out in 62 seconds. After 15 minutes a

command is given to switch on the rocket motor of the first stage of the Pershing-1A missile. After 45 seconds the rocket fuel of the first stage is burned up.

The dark green casing of the first stage is then brought on an automatic loader to a car crusher. Specialists fix the casing on the crusher—the push of a button and powerful steel blades crush the casing. The officials and journalists present at the ceremony meet the event with applause. U.S. Vice President George Bush, who arrived to witness the firings, stressed that the current destruction of missiles was only a beginning. The vice president said that that day would be remembered as the beginning of a process of destruction of weapons of annihilation. At the same time the vice president spoke of the need to conduct the policy from the positions of strength.

Brigadier General Roland Lajoie, director of the American on-site inspection agency, said that the destruction of missiles led to better understanding and, hopefully, to greater trust between the USSR and USA. Speaking in a TASS interview General Lajoie described the day as historic. He noted that the process of missile destruction would take three years to complete. Another nine missiles were to be destroyed at the Longhorn plant within a week after September 12. Then the crushed casings would be buried in a specially assigned place.

The elimination of missiles is the result of the conclusion of the Soviet-U.S. INF Treaty. Brigadier General Frank Partlow said in a TASS interview. The American negotiators at Geneva were currently working on a broader agreement on strategic offensive weapons, he continued. The general expressed the hope that that agreement would be drafted.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

CDU, SPD Disagree on Disarmament Policy

52002449b Frankfurt/Main *FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG* in German 2 Jul 88 p 4

[Article: "SPD Wants Three Additional Zero Solutions. CDU Criticism of Social Democrat's Guideline Proposal on Defense Policy"]

[Text] Bonn, 1 July—Far-reaching dissent between the CDU and the SPD on defense policy has become evident with the submission of a guideline proposal on disarmament policy which the SPD executive board unanimously adopted last Thursday and sent on to the next party conference. This is clear from the initial reactions of the CDU. The CDU member of the parliament, Lamers, head of the CDU faction for disarmament and arms control, said the SPD proposals are tantamount to zero solutions for the West. They reduced weapons defenses, he said, but did not take human rights into account. The CSU member of parliament, Geiger, foreign policy spokeswoman for the CSU faction, said that with this proposal the SPD had taken itself out of the alliance.

This dissent involves not only what the proposal says regarding cutting the number of current NATO forces in half and on top of that urging a reduction of offensive weapons systems, "coupled with limits on the stationing of troops to prevent concentrations capable of launching an attack." Of even more concern to the CDU is what the SPD says concerning further handling of nuclear weapons. The proposal argues in favor of doing away with nuclear battlefield weapons. This would permit "a unilateral beginning" without being at odds with one's own security interests. The SPD proposal advocates additional zero solutions for short-range nuclear missiles with a range of between 150 and 500 km, which would remain in Europe according to the double-zero solution, as well as for "new" air-support medium-range nuclear weapons. The implementation of these three additional zero solutions would mean that the "dual capable" fighter aircraft which can be fitted with both conventional and nuclear weapons would be the last remaining nuclear weapons in Europe—with the exception of the systems maintained under the national sovereignty of France and England. In its proposal the SPD expressly rejects replacement of NATO's "Lance" missile with new short-range missiles (or so-called "modernization").

The reason given is that short-range nuclear missiles lose their usefulness when both sides relinquish their structural conventional attack capability. Therefore, according to the proposal all tactical nuclear weapons (thus also aircraft with nuclear capability) should be destroyed—or at least withdrawn from the countries which have no nuclear weapons themselves—at that same moment that conventional stability is achieved in Europe.

Intermediate steps toward this goal are to be an agreement on a chemical-free zone, as well as on a nuclear-free corridor. From the nuclear-free corridor suggested by the Palme Commission—which would be 150 meters wide on either side of the border between the two German states and between West Germany and Czechoslovakia—the SPD wants also to remove all "heavy attack-capable weaponry," in particular, tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and attack helicopters.

The SPD urges that the negotiations on conventional disarmament between the Atlantic and the Urals begin as soon as possible and that the air forces "naturally" be included in these negotiations from the beginning. In this regard the proposal supports a demand which the Soviet Union is currently making in the effort to establish a negotiating mandate for this conference in Vienna. Unlike the FRG government and the NATO partners, the SPD proposal urges that the negotiations on nuclear disarmament should "absolutely not" be postponed until after the negotiations are completed on the establishment of conventional stability. It demands parallel negotiations on conventional stability and on the elimination of short-range nuclear weapons.

12552

Genscher, Scholz, Teltschik Agree on Conventional Disarmament

52002449a Munich *SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG* in German 15 Jul 88 p 4

[Article by Stephan-Andreas Casdorff: "Bonn Reaction Unified This Time. Higher Level Meeting Expected to Provide Impetus for Conventional Disarmament"]

[Text] Bonn, 14 Jul—Besides the usual conflict there is also something positive to report in Bonn these days: agreement within the FRG government on the question of conventional disarmament. The prediction that an open conflict between the Foreign Office and the Defense Ministry would soon be apparent and also the oft reported distance between the Chancellery and the Foreign Ministry—on this point at least neither turned out to be true.

Horst Teltschik, advisor to the chancellor, and Rupert Scholz, the minister of defense, along with the foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, have recently expressed the hope that yet this year—in conjunction with the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) follow-up conference in Vienna—a mandate will be granted for negotiating a reduction in the war material and troops of both of the alliance systems in Europe. Should the conference take place, they are likewise in agreement in calling for forceful initiatives, i.e., "signals" that the intention to reduce armaments is to be taken seriously.

The question of who should provide these signals, the heads of state or the foreign ministers, will therefore also not ignite any controversy. Genscher has found a formula which everyone in the coalition can live with. In text composed during his vacation in Greece he writes, "The successful conclusion of the CSCE followup conference opens up the way for negotiations on conventional stability and on other measures for the establishment of trust. Following the mandate given by the CSCE followup conference, it would appear useful to initiate the negotiations on conventional arms control with a meeting at a high political level in order to provide the right kinds of impetus in the difficult negotiating process."

Defense Minister Scholz, Genscher's supposed adversary, recently expressed similar sentiments during his inaugural visit to Washington. Scholz, who calls himself a liberal conservative, thus shows a willingness to cooperate. On the other hand, it is known that Genscher considers Scholz to be intelligent and, as the foreign minister recently announced to his confidants, he prefers to work with intelligent people.

As far as the "right kinds of impetus" mentioned by Genscher are concerned, it is clear that naturally he would not oppose a request to set up a conference on conventional disarmament among his fellow foreign ministers. However, the drumbeat that he is looking for would be for the heads of state to meet. Their participation within the scope of the CSCE process would be more unusual and therefore carry greater weight—similar to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.

There are differences to report, above all in the estimations of the policies of Mikhail Gorbachev. Genscher has now reinforced his view that the Soviet general secretary has already backed up his words with actions. The head of Bonn's foreign office points out the agreement on intermediate-range missiles and the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Defense Minister Scholz is more skeptical in this regard. He sees a reasonable settlement on conventional disarmament as "the" test for Gorbachev. But these differences are really just shades of the same viewpoint which are probably the result of the differing approaches of the two ministries. An indication that this is so is that both Scholz and Genscher expect more precise information from Gorbachev on his suggestion to speak about disarmament at a summit in Europe with U.S. participation.

12552

SPD Calls for Further Western Disarmament
LD0109124488 Hamburg DPA in German
1101 GMT 1 Sep 88

[From DPA news summary]

[Text] Muenster (DPA)—The SPD rejects the modernization of nuclear missiles and considers the unilateral removal of nuclear battlefield weapons by the Western

side possible as an interim step toward another zero-option between East and West. A relevant motion today was approved by a large majority at the SPD party conference in Muenster. The motion calls on the West to state its readiness to halve NATO forces and to more radically reduce offensive weapons systems. At the start of the debate, Honorary SPD Chairman Brandt warned his party against falling "into rhetorical disarmament euphoria." Brandt spoke in favor of German soldiers participating in UN peace-keeping forces.

9 Pershing-2 Missiles Removed From Waldheide

LD0109100788 Hamburg DPA in German
0916 GMT 1 Sep 88

[Excerpt] Heilbronn (DPA)—The first Pershing-2 missiles in the Federal Republic were removed today from their base at Waldheide near Heilbronn. A battery consisting of nine missiles left the U.S. Army site on Army transporters at around 1000 [0800 GMT]. This means a further stage in the implementation of the INF Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles in Europe.

Approximately 100 journalists and 50 peace demonstrators watched as nine Pershings were removed from Waldheide in two groups of vehicles. The first column contained the launching vehicles for the nine intermediate-range missiles. According to the U.S. Army, the second group, consisting of twelve transporters carrying containers, was loaded with the first and second missile stages and radar and guidance equipment. The nuclear warheads are to be transported separately by air to the United States at an unstated time. [passage omitted]

FRANCE

USSR, U.S. Reportedly in Connivance on SS-20 Missiles' Nature

52002448 Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French
7-13 Jul 88 p 38

[Article by Jacques Sapir: "Disarmament: The Euro-missiles Were not What They Were Believed to Be; The Europeans Were Fooled by Moscow and Washington"]

[Text] The SS-20 "Euromissile," renamed SS-25, suddenly becomes an intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]. Who is fooling whom?

The Soviets may have lied: the SS-20s were not what they were believed to be. Jacques Sapir's theory raises the question of "military truth."

Did the Soviets and the Americans fool the Europeans? Acting in connivance, they may have lied, each for their own reasons, on the nature of the famous Soviet SS-20s that were said to threaten Europe.

The revelations made by Jacques Sapir will make waves.

Especially since, now that Moscow and Washington are merrily dismantling their "European" missiles, we learn that some of the Soviet SS-20s, hardly modified and renamed SS-25, will turn into ICBMs. Strange, isn't it?

Since the late 1970's, the Soviet SS-20s have dominated the European defense scene. They were called "Euromissiles" because of their range, supposedly 2,700-5,000 km, i.e., not long enough to reach the United States.

However, an analysis of the dimensions of that missile, published in the specialized press, left a doubt as to its weight, and therefore as to its range. But a conservative estimate¹ could support the belief that it weighed at least 20 tons (and not 16 as indicated). This meant that its range would exceed 7,500 km, making it actually an intercontinental missile threatening the United States.

The recent publication of a new analysis of this missile supports this view.² Actually, the SS-20 is much larger and heavier (at least 35.26 tons) than had been said. There can no longer be any doubt that it has an intercontinental range.

An irony of fate... just when the missile that worried the Europeans so much is about to disappear, it turns out that it was not meant for them.... Irony or disinformation? If the SS-20 was in fact a mobile ICBM whose *raison d'être* for the Soviets was to diminish the vulnerability of their deterrent power, then the "panic" that justified the deployment of the Pershing II and GLCM was unfounded.

Actually, considering that the SS-20 appeared in the late 1970's, it was probably designed between 1965 and 1970, at a time when the Soviet arsenal was particularly vulnerable.

The Europeans, therefore, may well have been caught in the vise of a double lie:

- from the Soviets, who presented the SS-20 as an intermediate-range weapon so as not to violate openly the SALT-II treaty;
- from the Americans, who went along with them to justify the deployment of weapons such as the Pershing and cruise missiles.

Neither of these lies was militarily significant. The inclusion of the SS-20 in the Soviet strategic arsenal did not in any way alter the overall nuclear balance. As for the U.S. missiles, they represented only a marginal addition to the arsenal of "theater" weapons.

Politically, however, they helped focus the debate on European security on problems over which the Europeans had no control, thus taking their fate out of their own hands.

Footnotes

1. J. Sapir, "Soviet Military Strategy," *LA DECOUVERTE*, Paris, 1988, pp 164-170.

2. "Further Details Released on SS-20 Saber Missile," *Jane's Defence Week*, 30 February 1988, pp 182-183.

9294

ITALY

Chervov Comments on Disarmament Prospects

*PM0709102288 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian
2 Sep 88 p 14*

[Report on interview with Soviet disarmament negotiator General Nikolay Chervov by Marco Ansaldi at unspecified location in Italy; date not given]

[Text] Rome—"Despite the disagreements over the ABM Treaty, I am confident that it will be possible to reach an understanding with the United States on a 50-percent reduction of strategic weapons. It is technically possible: All the documents are ready; it is merely necessary to eliminate the parentheses that indicate the disagreements between the Americans and us. There is not much time left but the signing could take place even before the end of January, that is, by the end of Reagan's term of office. We want to conclude the agreement with him. Be that as it may, the negotiating process is irreversible. We have sent out a 'bridge' to the next Washington administration, whoever the next president may be—Bush or Dukakis—with a view to reaching new understandings."

In Italy to attend a roundtable on disarmament at the L'UNITA festival in Florence, General Nikolay Chervov, head of a department in the Soviet General Staff, took stock in an interview with *LA REPUBBLICA* of some aspects of East-West negotiations, the process of renewal within the Red Army, and Gorbachev's "new doctrine" in foreign policy. Age 66 and with a striking resemblance to Anthony Quinn, Chervov is, by virtue of his age and experience (he has long been a top Soviet Defense Ministry official), one of Mikhail Gorbachev's most trusted aides and one of the leading arms control negotiators. At present he is following the Geneva and Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, space, and chemical and biological weapons.

"Nevertheless," the general explained, "there are many difficulties. On technical matters the U.S. position and ours are still remote. What is needed to resolve these difficulties is U.S. political will. The negotiations have made major steps forward on the limitation of strategic weapons but certainly not on the verification and controls to which they must be subject."

[Ansaldo] General Chervov, with regard to disarmament there has been no more talk about the proposal launched by Gorbachev in Yugoslavia in March of a withdrawal of the U.S. and USSR fleets from the Mediterranean. Why this silence?

[Chervov] We must reproach our propaganda and journalists, who evidently have not persevered in reporting on the issue. These proposals are still valid; we are constantly reaffirming them to the Americans—as we did recently to Secretary of Defense Carlucci and Admiral Crowe. We are in favor not only of reducing the naval presence but also of limiting naval activity. This, because war can break out even at sea and, whereas the land forces are all under control, naval forces are not. The USSR is ready to withdraw its navy ships from the Mediterranean if the United States does the same. We want the Mediterranean to be a sea of peace.

[Ansaldo] Wednesday Hungarian Foreign Minister Varkonyi again mentioned the possibility of a withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary. Few people in Europe believe you would go as far as to take such a step....

[Chervov] At the latest Warsaw Pact meeting a plan was put forward that was immediately accepted by all the allied countries. The Pact is ready to withdraw its troops from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany—not unilaterally but on a multilateral basis with the NATO countries. As for Varkonyi's remarks, I know nothing about them.

[Ansaldo] In recent statements by top party and military leaders, including some in the Soviet press, great emphasis has been placed on the need for the Armed Forces to perform a prime role in the restructuring process.

[Chervov] The position is that set out by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to party leaders. It was a speech delivered precisely in the spirit of glasnost and restructuring. Our strategic line entails the qualitative renewal of the Soviet Armed Forces. So there will be no quantitative increase in the Army or in weapons production.

[Ansaldo] Regional crises: The Moscow press is devoting increasing coverage to the problems of reintegrating Soviet troops back from Afghanistan. You have a problem similar to that experienced by the Americans with their Vietnam veterans.

[Chervov] It is natural for there to be difficulties for youngsters returning from the front. We cannot resolve them all overnight. I assure you that our government is working to ensure their reintegration into civilian life as soon as possible.

[Ansaldo] Yesterday saw the end of the China-USSR talks on the Cambodian issue. Do you believe an accord with Beijing on the Indochinese crisis is possible while troops remain on the border?

[Chervov] Peace in Afghanistan has prompted a chain reaction in regional conflicts—the cease-fire in the Gulf, the accords in southern Africa. Yes, I believe there will be positive developments for Cambodia too in the future.

[Ansaldo] General Ziaul Haq is dead. You did not consider him a friend. Now there is talk of opposition leader Benazir Bhutto's succession in Pakistan. Would the USSR like this?

[Chervov] We want our southern borders to be peaceful. Pakistan will determine its future autonomously. If a more democratic leadership emerges from the elections, it will be a good thing—for us and for the West.

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